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When is fertility too low or too high? Population policy
preferences of demographers around the world
Hendrik P. van Dalen1,2 and Kène Henkens1,3,4
1Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, 2Tilburg University, 3University Medical Center
Groningen, 4University of Amsterdam
When does fertility in a country become so low or so high that a government needs to intervene? This paper
sheds light on this population policy question, based on a worldwide survey among demographers. We
examine how professionals’ policy preferences regarding fertility levels are affected by their views on the
impacts of population growth/decline and by fertility in their country of residence. The median
respondent suggests intervention once fertility goes below 1.4 children or above 3.0. Three results stand
out: first, demographers who are concerned about the carrying capacity of the earth are more willing to
intervene than those who are less concerned. Second, the context of decision-making matters: experts
living in high-fertility countries are more set on intervention than those living in low-fertility countries, but
their threshold fertility level is also higher. Third, political orientation matters: right-leaning demographers
are more set on government intervention than left-leaning demographers.
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policy
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Introduction
Population and fertility developments divide govern-
ments worldwide. In the least developed parts of the
world, most governments express a willingness to
decrease total fertility (De Silva and Tenreyro 2017;
UN 2017). The mirror image of this policy stance
can be found in the developed world, where below-
replacement fertility causes concern for govern-
ments, as populations might decline and age. Some
governments have developed policies aimed at
increasing fertility, whereas other governments
abstain from such interventions. This divide in the
sense of urgency has not always existed in policy
circles. During the 1960s and 1970s, only a minority
of governments in the developing world were set
on achieving lower fertility. Concern about popu-
lation growth was widespread in academic circles
and the media in western societies in the 1960s and
1970s (Lam 2011). Population decline was not a
widespread phenomenon at that time, nor was it a
prominent issue among governments. The latest
United Nations (UN) report on population policies
around the world gives a very different picture:
currently almost 90 per cent of the least developed
countries are aiming to lower fertility and the
majority of developed countries are set on increasing
fertility. Assessments of whether the level of fertility
is too high or too low seem to vary across time and
place. Judging from debates in national (Teitelbaum
and Winter 1985; Kohler et al. 2002) and inter-
national forums, such as the International Confer-
ence on Population and Development (ICPD) and
follow-up population conferences (Van Dalen and
Scharf 2014; May 2017), the opinions of governments
seem to be based on a mix of ideological factors and a
sense of urgency shared by politicians and citizens
about the negative consequences of population
growth or decline for their own country. Media atten-
tion to low fertility (cf. Stark and Kohler 2002)
suggests that despite there being positive sides to
low fertility, it is generally seen as a phenomenon
with negative consequences, and corrective govern-
ment action to move in the direction of replacement
fertility is called for. From various sides within demo-
graphy, the replacement fertility level is viewed as
having limited relevance to policy practice. Lutz
(2014), for instance, has made a strong case that
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replacement fertility is not a good guide for today’s
population policy and that population policy cannot
be discussed in purely demographic terms. He
stated that there can be ‘economic reasons why
long-term fertility levels somewhat below replace-
ment would be preferable to replacement level’
(Lutz 2014, p. 528). Lee and Mason (2014) and Lee
(2016) have approached the problem of transfers
within populations from a macroeconomic point of
view and come to similar conclusions.
The divergence in population policy stances
across the world may be of particular concern
now that the issue of climate change has gained
prominence, and global concerns should ideally be
part of population policy debates in both developed
and less developed countries. However, as insiders
within demography have noted (Bongaarts and
Sinding 2009; Bongaarts and O’Neill 2018),
support for population policy, and family planning
in particular, is viewed with scepticism and is
associated with issues of ‘coercion’ and unethical
policy practices (Sen 1997). This may have been
an accurate description of distant times when neo-
Malthusian proponents and organizations tried to
stem high fertility. However, ever since the ICPD
at Cairo in 1994, coercive and unethical population
policies have been explicitly condemned. The sub-
sequent Programme of Action (UNFPA 1994) rec-
ommended that population policies should focus
on human rights, sexual equality, and reproductive
health. In line with this focus, it was stressed that
reproductive health programmes, including family
planning, should be completely voluntary.
In this paper we examine the population policy
preferences of demographers with respect to total
fertility in their country of residence. We focus on
two research questions: (1) Should governments
intervene in matters of low fertility or high fertility,
and if so, at what fertility levels is government inter-
vention deemed appropriate? and (2) To what extent
are these demographers’ policy preferences influ-
enced by their country’s demographic context (a
high- or low-fertility setting), their assessments of
the consequences of population growth or decline,
and their political orientation? At this point we
want to stress that in this paper the term ‘government
intervention’ is understood to be a government
policy that adheres to the principle of voluntariness,
and should be interpreted as, for example, providing
information or facilitating choices by changing incen-
tives (parental leave, childcare support, or access to
contraception), as perceived to be the case in
today’s practice of family planning (Robinson and
Ross 2007; Bongaarts and Sinding 2009; Bailey
2013). Disentangling the drivers of population
policy preferences helps us to understand why
expert opinions may differ and why: for example,
debates about population policies can generate ten-
sions as a result of participants coming from different
regions of the world, or for reasons related to individ-
ual concerns about population developments and
political orientation.
We examine these preferences by using a unique
worldwide data set on the views of demographers
from 93 different countries (see Van Dalen and
Henkens 2012). Opinions of population experts are
important because these experts inform policy-
makers and are likely to be more informed than poli-
ticians, with a long-term perspective on population
developments. By examining the policy preferences
of experts around the globe, not only can we profit
from this knowledge diversity and see what unites
experts, but we can indirectly gain a better under-
standing of the diversity in fertility-related popu-
lation policies and why in some places population
policy is welcomed whereas in other places it is
viewed with scepticism or hostility.
Four important insights are presented. First of
all, there is a wide interval of non-intervention in
matters of fertility when we look at the median
respondent: fertility levels between 1.4 and 3.0
may raise concern, but do not convince demogra-
phers that government intervention is necessary.
Second, concerns about the carrying capacity of
the earth, as well as concerns about population
decline (only in low-fertility settings), have an
impact on the threshold level of fertility at which
government intervention is deemed necessary.
Third, the political orientation of experts is impor-
tant in deciding on the principal issue of whether
governments should intervene in matters of ferti-
lity at all. Experts who place themselves on the
right of the political spectrum are more set on
intervention in matters of fertility than left-wing
experts. And finally, the fourth finding concerns
the importance of context in decision-making:
experts living in high-fertility countries are more
set on government intervention than those living
in low-fertility countries, but among those who
favour policy intervention, the threshold fertility
level is also higher.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. We first set
out the dilemmas of population policies in different
fertility settings, and subsequently present the data
set, models and methods used to explore the ques-
tion in more depth. This is followed by a section
reporting on our results, and we conclude with a
discussion.
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Perspectives on population policy
Population policies in both developed and less devel-
oped countries are becoming more visible among
government policies, as registered by the UN (see
Figure 1). Over the period 1976–2015 we can see a
clear increase in the percentage of more developed
countries that wanted to increase fertility; in 2015 a
clear majority (63 per cent) of the countries wanted
to raise fertility. In less developed countries a
strong interest in decreasing fertility exists, although
from 1996 onwards this interest has stabilized. This
does not apply to countries in the ‘least developed’
group, where virtually all governments are currently
set on lowering fertility.
This change in the population policies of
national governments is to some extent under-
standable if we consult the fertility development
over time shown in Figure 2. This figure shows
how the cumulative distribution of total fertility
rates (TFRs) across all the countries in the world
has changed between the early 1950s and the
most recent past. In the 1950s the TFR of the
median country was 6.00 children, whereas by
the period 2010–15 the TFR for the median
country had dropped to 2.35.
In the 1950s below-replacement fertility was vir-
tually non-existent, whereas for the period 2010–15
the TFR was below 2.1 children in approximately
40 per cent of the countries, and governments of
such countries might be concerned about the pro-
spect of population decline. The TFR was higher
than three children per woman in approximately
one-third of the countries, and experts living in
those countries might still share the concerns of
high fertility.
High-fertility settings
A fundamental question that must be considered by
governments is whether and when they should
intervene in matters of fertility. Over time these
questions have been given different answers.
Above-replacement fertility and high population
growth were conditions that most developed
countries shared with less developed nations after
the Second World War. Demographers who
obtained their education during the 1960s and
1970s could not escape the presence of neo-Malthu-
sian publications, such as The Population Bomb
(Ehrlich 1968), The Limits to Growth (Meadows
et al. 1972), and ‘The tragedy of the commons’
(Hardin 1968). Overpopulation was then a national
and international concern, and this stance was at
that time complemented by quite strong policy
statements. The ecologist Hardin stated that ‘No
technical solution can rescue us from the misery
Figure 1 Government population policies with respect to fertility in different regions of the world, selected
years 1976–2015
Source: UN, World Population Policies database, https://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/about_database.aspx.
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of overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin
to all’ (p. 1248). And his colleague Ehrlich was
equally strong in displaying his views. He embraced
the pessimistic Malthusian outlook and predicted
that population growth would lead to massive
famines, poverty, deaths, and perhaps a thermo-
nuclear war. And when it came to population
policy: ‘We must have population control at
home, hopefully through a system of incentives
and penalties, but by compulsion if voluntary
methods fail’ (Ehrlich 1968, p. 1).
By today’s standards, these answers appear out-
dated, and certainly the Cairo conference of 1994
has helped to promote the modern focus on repro-
ductive rights and sexual equality. The ICPD’s Pro-
gramme of Action (UNFPA 1994) stressed that in
advancing human well-being, governments should
place the human rights of individuals, rather than
numerical population targets, at the centre of the
global development agenda. Although the question
of whether population policies should be voluntary
has seemed like a settled issue for demographers
since the Cairo conference, family planning can still
be associated with coercive or unethical state inter-
vention: a state of affairs that, according to Bongaarts
and Sinding (2009), is not supported by facts. They
have claimed that despite exceptions such as China,
the perception that ‘family planning programs
throughout the developing world still place undue
pressure on families, in particular women, to
conform to reproductive norms imposed by govern-
ments […] is no longer supported by the evidence’
(p. 42).
Low-fertility settings
The setting of low fertility may be perceived as the
mirror image of a high-fertility setting, but that
would be an over-optimistic view, as low fertility
seems to have its own dynamic on which demogra-
phers have reported over time. The long-term
decline in fertility is usually depicted as an integral
part of the demographic transition. The naïve per-
spective to take in thinking about the future is to
assume that replacement fertility is some stable equi-
librium to which all populations converge. However,
the appearance of countries with very low fertility has
raised concern among policymakers and demogra-
phers that spontaneous corrections will not occur.
As Demeny (2015) has summarized: ‘Hoping for a
self-correcting spontaneous behavioural change is
not completely irrational—birth rates that have
fallen may also rise—but the benevolent working of
an Adam Smithian invisible hand, nudging very low
fertility rates back to replacement level is poorly sup-
ported by contemporary evidence’ (p. S80). Of
course, the problem demographers face in making
judgements about fertility developments is that they
have to deal with the uncertainty surrounding fertility
as reflected in period TFRs. Fluctuations in period
fertility are driven by both ‘tempo effects’ (transitory
changes in fertility timing) and ‘quantum effects’
(changes in the total number of children women
have). Cohort fertility is the preferred measure to
look at, but, of course, this measure can only be cap-
tured once an entire cohort has completed its child-
bearing (usually taken to be by the age of 45).
Figure 2 TFR distribution for all countries in the world as registered by the UN, 1950–55 and 2010–15
Source: UN (2017), N = 200 countries.
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Hence it takes some expert judgement to look
through the veil of aggregate fertility statistics to
see when a country is truly becoming a low-fertility
country. Myrskylä et al. (2013) have shown by the
use of a new method of constructing cohort fertility
rates that by and large, for most countries, the
cohort rate is higher than the period rate, suggesting
that earlier pessimistic views about a fertility ‘crisis’
or ‘trap’ (Lutz et al. 2006) were based on giving too
much weight to period TFRs. The uncertainty in
making judgements on fertility is also increased by
the presence of economic crises, which are likely to
depress fertility (Goldstein et al. 2013; Schneider
2015), via structural developments in the labour
market, such as the shift to more short-term contracts
(Billari 2018; Seltzer 2019) and by issues related to
sexual equity within households and society (McDo-
nald 2013; Anderson and Kohler 2015). It may
perhaps be summed up by the down-to-earth judge-
ment of Morgan (2003), who considers the state of
societies that display low fertility on a decadal time
scale: ‘For such countries, there is likely to be much
more wrong that low fertility’ (p. 600). And very
low fertility—even if this state is clouded by consider-
able uncertainty—is expected to generate tensions in
developed countries. In the absence of migration,
countries face the prospect of population decline
and, according to some, this fate is associated with
falling national identity (Teitelbaum and Winter
1998) or falling long-run economic growth prospects
(Bloom et al. 2010). In response to these develop-
ments, pleas for pronatalist policies have become
more visible over time (UN 2017). Although fear of
population decline and its consequences is wide-
spread among policymakers, demographers try to
provide the bigger picture and stress that a smaller
population size also ‘has social, economic and
environmental advantages’ (Coleman and Rowthorn
2011). Overall, this short overview suggests that
demographers may have some opinion on a threshold
level of fertility at which governments should start
becoming concerned about a state of very low ferti-
lity. Given the uncertainty in assessing fertility rates,
we can also expect the range of opinions to be large.
Hypotheses
In understanding the population policy preferences
of demographers for high- and low-fertility settings,
we focus in our analysis on three separate
hypotheses.
Our first hypothesis is that the choice of threshold
is based on an individual assessment of the societal
consequences of population growth or decline. The
perceived pros and cons of population growth or
decline are expected to be a major driver of prefer-
ences for government intervention. Two possible
consequences of population growth or decline are
deemed particularly important and hence used in
this paper: the assessment of the adverse economic
consequences of population decline for a country
and the assessment of adverse consequences of popu-
lation growth on the carrying capacity of the earth.
Second, policy preferences may be affected by the
demographic context of the respondent’s country of
residence. We know from the work in psychology
by Kahneman and by Tversky (Kahneman and
Tversky 1984; Tversky and Simonson 1993) that the
context of individual decision-making can have a dis-
tinctive impact. In issues of population policy this is
more or less an unexplored possibility and the
current paper offers the possibility of seeing
whether this is indeed the case. We assume that the
demographic context of a country will act as a refer-
ence point in deciding the threshold level of fertility,
that is, the level at which it is necessary to start gov-
ernment involvement in persuading families to adjust
their fertility. When fertility is high in the country of
residence, experts might be inclined to suggest higher
levels of intervention than those who live in countries
with much lower fertility. The basic reason for this
divergence among demographers is some form of
attachment to the status quo: even when an expert
wants the government to intervene, they will not
diverge too much from the status quo. Our second
hypothesis is that the fertility context works both
ways: demographers living in high-fertility countries
will adapt their preferences and prefer higher inter-
vention thresholds than those living in countries
with lower fertility. And the reverse also applies:
demographers living in low-fertility countries will
prefer a lower intervention threshold than those
living in countries with higher fertility.
Finally, policy preferences may be affected by the
values or political orientation of demographers.
Most fertility or population policy analyses ignore
the issue that such elements may be involved,
whereas in principle and practice, choices in popu-
lation will involve values and ethics (Van Dalen
2008; Atkinson 2014; Dasgupta and Dasgupta
2017). In particular, issues of government interven-
tion revolve around how much value respondents
attach to the issue of freedom of choice and
whether they think that unfettered individual
choices will be superior to collective decisions in
matters of fertility. Our third hypothesis is that
demographers who position themselves on the
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political right will have a more neo-liberal, or in some
cases libertarian worldview, will cherish freedom of
choice in the broadest sense of the term, and will
have a strong aversion to government intervention
compared with those on the political left, who see
government primarily as the best candidate for
taking corrective actions whenever individual behav-
iour hurts collective interests.
Methods and data
To shed light on the factors affecting population
policy preferences, we use a survey among the
members of the International Union for the Scientific
Study of Population (IUSSP) carried out in 2009. The
total number of respondents consisted of 758
demographers from different corners of the world
(see Van Dalen and Henkens 2012). The IUSSP,
founded in 1928, is a worldwide organization of
population scientists, and aims ‘to promote the scien-
tific study of population, encourage exchange
between researchers around the globe, and stimulate
interest in population issues’. The sample, based on
the IUSSP directory, has the advantages of: (1) a
worldwide coverage of demographers; and
(2) members who are a mixed crowd of both aca-
demics and practitioners involved in setting up
family planning programmes, organizing censuses,
or keeping account of the state of the national popu-
lation. The survey was internet-based, and the link
was sent out via email through the IUSSP secretariat
to all its members. To stimulate response, the survey
was set up in the two languages used within the
IUSSP: English and French; 86 per cent of respon-
dents used the English version. The response rate
(taking into account only the fully filled out question-
naires) was 35 per cent, well above response rates for
similar expert surveys (cf. Klein and Stern 2005). The
sample distribution is in line with the IUSSP’s mem-
bership composition: 76 per cent of members are
affiliated with a university or research institute,
with the remainder dominated by demographers
working for a government agency (12 per cent) or
non-governmental organization (NGO) (8 per
cent), with 4 per cent working in the private sector.
The distribution of respondents in the sample by
age, region, and sex is roughly in line with the compo-
sition of IUSSP members (see Van Dalen and
Henkens 2012, p. 406).
Table 1 provides an overview of the independent
and dependent variables and their definitions as
used in this paper. The dependent variables are
measured by two questions. First, respondents were
asked ‘When fertility is below the replacement
level, at what level of the fertility rate (TFR) do
you think that a government should take measures
in order to stimulate fertility?’ Answer categories
were: at a TFR of 1.8; 1.6; 1.4; 1.2; 1.0; 0.8 or lower;
or never intervene. Second, respondents were
asked ‘When fertility is above the replacement
level, at what level of the fertility rate (TFR) do
you think that a government should take measures
in order to reduce fertility?’ Answer categories
were: at a TFR of 2.5; 3.0; 3.5; 4.0; 4.5; 5.0 or
higher; or never intervene. The dependent variables
are presented at the top of Table 1 and show the
means and standard deviations of the government
intervention (dummy) variable and the stated
threshold level of fertility intervention in each type
of fertility regime. Although we did not explicate
the type of TFR in the survey for reasons of
brevity, readers should be aware of the fact that
period and cohort fertility rates may diverge.
Period TFRs are generally more volatile, as they
are more affected by conditions in the year they are
measured, for instance, transitory factors relating to
the number of births to each cohort or the average
age of childbearing. Cohort fertility serves more
long-run purposes, but in actual practice, measuring
cohort rates takes more time and in actual policy dis-
cussions, period TFRs or adjusted TFRs are used to
deal with this problem (cf. Bongaarts and Feeney
1998; Schoen 2004; Sobotka 2004).
The key explanatory variables consist of political
orientation (five-point Likert scale), and respon-
dents’ reports of whether they are concerned about
the prospects of overpopulation or population
decline. The key variables describing views with
respect to population and development refer to the
consequences of world population outstripping the
earth’s carrying capacity and whether population
decline might decrease economic growth. Close to
50 per cent of the demographers disagree with the
statement ‘The current size of the world population
exceeds the carrying capacity of the earth’. But a sub-
stantial share of the demographers (33 per cent)
agree with the statement and the remainder take an
agnostic position. With respect to population
decline, only 17 per cent expect negative effects of
population decline, 60 per cent disagree, and 23 per
cent take a neutral position. The other key variable
that we are interested in refers to the political orien-
tation of population experts: 45 per cent are oriented
towards the political left, 38 per cent take the middle
position, and 17 per cent favour the political
right. The other variables are used as control
variables.
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To assess the impact of the fertility context of
decision-making, we use a country-level variable:
the net reproduction rate (NRR). This variable is
based on a source outside the survey, namely the
UN estimates for the time period 2005–10 (UN
2017). The NRR is deemed the most appropriate
variable for capturing the context of decision-
making in a parsimonious manner, as it incorporates
information not only on fertility but also on women’s
mortality. The estimation results do not change much
when including both the TFR and women’s mortality
in the country of residence, but in multilevel analysis
we should be cautious in including too many country-
level variables.
To control for other factors that might impinge on
policy preferences, we control for age; sex; the ques-
tion of whether respondents possess expert knowl-
edge with respect to fertility, reproductive health,
and family planning; the institution at which
respondents work, either academic (university or a
research institute) or applied (government agency,
NGO, or private sector organization); and finally
whether demographers speak French or English
(respondents could fill in a French or English
language version of the survey; see Van Dalen and
Henkens (2012) for details).
The analysis is carried out in two steps. First, we
analyse by means of multilevel logit analysis the
decision to support government intervention in
matters of fertility in a country. And in a second
step, for those who favour involvement, we
examine by means of multilevel ordered logit analy-
sis, at what threshold level they would start govern-
ment intervention. Multilevel analysis is used
because experts are nested within 93 countries, with
an average of 8.2 experts per country. Preference
for the ordered logit analysis of six ordered options
instead of the simpler regression analysis is based







When fertility is below the replacement level, at what level of
the fertility rate (TFR) do you think a government should
take measures in order to stimulate fertility? Never (= 0) or




When fertility is above the replacement level, at what level of
the fertility rate (TFR) level do you think a government
should take measures in order to reduce fertility? Never (= 0)
or one of six TFR levels (= 1)
0.89 0.32
TFR levels of intervention in
low-fertility regimes
For those that prefer intervention, the threshold level is
measured by the options (1.8; 1.6; 1.4; 1.2; 1.0; 0.8 or lower =
0.8)
1.44 0.32
TFR levels of intervention in
high-fertility regimes
For those that prefer intervention, the threshold level is




Net reproduction rate Net reproduction rate in country of residence as reported for
2005–10 (UN 2017)
1.11 0.41
Political orientation How would you place your views on a scale from left (= 1) to
right (= 5)?
2.53 0.98
View on carrying capacity Agreement with statement ‘The current size of the world
population exceeds the carrying capacity of the earth’ (1 =
fully disagree to 5 = fully agree)
2.80 1.30
View on population decline Agreement with statement ‘Population decline will decrease the
rate of economic growth’ (1 = fully disagree to 5 = fully agree)
2.40 1.04
Sex Male (= 0), Female (= 1) 0.36 0.48
Age Years 48.21 14.08
Language Language used in questionnaire (English = 0; French = 1) 0.14 0.35
Work environment Academic (university or research institute = 0), Policy-oriented
(government agency, NGO, or private sector = 1)
0.20 0.40
Expert-level knowledge on
fertility and family planning
Self-rated knowledge on fertility, reproductive health, and
family planning (1 = low; 2 =medium; 3 = high)
2.38 0.67
Note: N= 758.
Source: Authors’ own worldwide survey of demographers in 2009.
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on the fact that both intervention questions contain
open-ended options (a threshold TFR of 0.8 or
lower; and a threshold TFR of 5.0 or higher), which
are difficult to assign a precise numerical value to,
as well as different intervals (low-fertility regime
intervals jump by 0.2 and high-fertility intervals by
0.5). With respect to the use of this two-step
approach, we initially used Heckman’s two-step
selection method (Heckman 1979) to test for selec-
tion problems, with assessed quality of long-run fore-
casts on fertility, mortality, and migration, as well as
self-reported knowledge about fertility, mortality,
and migration as the additional variables (also regis-
tered in the survey, see Van Dalen and Henkens
2012) in the selection equation. Clear signs of selec-
tion were not observed, hence we resorted to the
use of the two-step approach presented here.
Results
Stated population policy preferences
Table 2 captures the prevailing views of experts on
when government support is needed to stimulate fer-
tility if fertility is deemed too low, and when to inter-
vene (e.g. by offering access to contraception) if
fertility is deemed too high.
An obvious norm for judging fertility develop-
ments in countries where low mortality is the rule is
the fertility replacement level of 2.1, even though
this norm is highly debated. Lutz (2014) has made
the claim that replacement-level fertility is not a
meaningful policy goal, as ‘it has little to do with
actually maintaining the size of a population in con-
temporary societies, which have irregular age struc-
tures and experience migration and mortality
changes’ (p. 528). Lutz’s focus was very much
directed at western countries, where low fertility is
the rule, and he claimed that replacement level ferti-
lity can be significantly different from 2.1. In a way,
Table 2 confirms this insight as the median respon-
dent gives a threshold fertility level of 1.4 for inter-
vention in low-fertility regimes. This figure comes
close to what demographic research (Striessnig and
Lutz 2013; Lee and Mason 2014) has shown to be
‘optimal’ fertility, based on models that explicitly
take into account the economic effects of population
growth and age structure.
The impression of a diverse group of professionals
can also be deduced from the bottom half of Table 2,
where the median respondent picks a threshold ferti-
lity level of 3.0 for intervention in high-fertility
regimes. Note that, for less developed countries, the
threshold value will probably be higher than the stan-
dard replacement level of 2.1 because mortality, and
sometimes even the sex ratio at birth, may differ sub-
stantially from what is standard in developed
countries. Espenshade et al. (2003) showed for the
period 1995–2000 that the replacement fertility
level in the least developed countries was around
2.7, and in countries with very low survival rates,
such as Sierra Leone, this replacement level can
approach 3.5. More recent estimates by Gietel-
Basten and Scherbov (2019) show that replacement
fertility levels have fallen across the world.
However, the fact that quite a number of demogra-
phers give higher threshold levels suggests that
Table 2 Population policy preferences of demographers for intervention in high- and low-fertility regimes
Fertility threshold level for intervention in low-fertility regime Never intervene
1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 or lower
Percentage distribution 26.0 14.2 16.9 10.6 10.7 5.6 16.0
Cumulative distribution 26.0 40.2 57.1 67.7 78.4 84.0 100.0
Fertility threshold level for intervention in high-fertility regime Never intervene
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 or higher
Percentage distribution 29.1 21.7 12.4 15.1 3.1 7.4 11.2
Cumulative distribution 29.1 50.8 63.2 78.3 81.4 88.8 100.0
Notes:Question posed for low-fertility regimes: ‘When fertility is below the replacement level, at what level of the fertility rate (TFR) do you
think that a government should take measures in order to stimulate fertility?’ The cumulative percentages should be interpreted as follows: at
TFR 1.8 (just below the replacement level of 2.1), 26 per cent of respondents think governments should intervene to increase the TFR; 40 per
cent support intervention at TFR 1.6, etc.; and 84.0 per cent support intervention at TFR 0.8 or lower. Hence 16.0 per cent are in favour of
non-intervention whatever the below-replacement TFR level is. The corresponding question for the high-fertility regime was: ‘When fertility
is above the replacement level, at what level of the fertility rate (TFR) do you think that a government should take measures in order to
reduce fertility?’
Source: As for Table 1.
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other factors are at play in explaining their popu-
lation policy preferences.
A final observation on Table 2 is that a minority of
demographers abstain from government intervention
in both fertility regimes: 16.0 per cent of the demogra-
phers prefer governments never to intervene in the
case of high-fertility regimes and 11.2 per cent in the
case of low-fertility regimes. These demographers
may be concerned, for example, that in practice,
tacit elements of coercion may still be present,
despite the general consensus that family planning
should be voluntary. Most demographers interviewed
display a high degree of consensus with respect to the
issue that government should in principle intervene at
a certain point. Of course, the type of government
intervention may vary from providing information
to access to health services or financial incentives.
These differences are not explored.
Understanding population policy preferences
The multivariate analyses of the choices—whether
and when to support government intervention—are
presented in Table 3.
Intervention or non-intervention? The results
show that demographers living in countries with a
high NRR are far more likely to support government
intervention in high-fertility regimes than demogra-
phers living in a country with a low NRR (Model
3). When considering the support for government
intervention in low fertility regimes (Model 1), this
demographic context effect is not significant.
Second, we estimate the impact of demographers’
judgements about the consequences of population
growth and decline. In the low-fertility regime,
these judgements do not have an impact on the pre-
ference for intervention (Model 1). However, in the
high fertility regime judgements clearly have an
impact on the principal issue of government interven-
tion: the more demographers agree that the world
population level exceeds the carrying capacity of
the earth, the more they are willing to let government
interfere in the case of high fertility (Model 3). Issues
of population decline are of no significance, as
expected.
And third, political orientation matters when it
comes to the choice of whether government should
intervene or not in changing a country’s fertility
(Models 1 and 3). In the case of a low-fertility
Table 3 Explanation of preference to intervene in fertility level and, for those who prefer to intervene, the TFR level
threshold among demographers, worldwide
Policies for low-fertility regimes Policies for high-fertility regimes
Intervention











Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Country-level variable
Net reproduction rate in country of residence 0.45 0.37 −0.16 0.21 0.88** 0.43 0.67*** 0.27
Individual perceptions and orientation
Carrying capacity of the world 0.05 0.09 −0.16*** 0.06 0.68*** 0.13 −0.28*** 0.06
Negative consequences of population decline −0.01 0.11 0.15** 0.07 −0.03 0.13 0.04 0.07
Political orientation 0.51*** 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.30** 0.15 0.05 0.08
Control variables
Sex (male = 0) −0.06 0.23 −0.31* 0.16 −0.41 0.27 0.29* 0.16
Age (years) −0.02* 0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.02*** 0.01
Work environment (academic = 0) −0.02 0.27 −0.34* 0.18 0.39 0.36 −0.11 0.18
French (English = 0) 0.21 0.37 0.61*** 0.24 −0.27 0.37 0.33 0.27
Knowledge of fertility −0.05 0.16 0.29*** 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.20* 0.12
Constant 0.95 0.93 – – −0.18 1.08 – –
Random effects parameter:
Country 0.39 0.23 0.06 0.08 0.37 0.27 0.53 0.19
N 758 637 752 668
Log-likelihood −305.8 −1,054.0 −223.8 −1,015.7
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Notes:Models 1 and 3 are estimated by means of multilevel logit analysis; Models 2 and 4 are estimated by means of multilevel ordered logit
analysis; estimated cut-off points are not shown in the table. Coef. refers to the coefficient and s.e. is the standard error.
Source: As for Table 1.
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regime, the political orientation of experts is the only
factor of significance.Contrary to the expectation that
experts who position themselves on the political right
would be in favour of non-intervention of government
and pro freedomof choice, this does not seem to apply
to demographic issues: demographers on the political
right are more in favour of intervention than
demographers on the left of the political spectrum.
This effect also applies for demographers deciding
on this issue for a high-fertility regime; however, the
impact of political orientation in a high-fertility
regime is smaller than in the low-fertility regime.
At which fertility level should government
intervene? Models 2 and 4 present the results for
explaining the threshold fertility level (for high-
and low-fertility regimes) at which government inter-
vention is deemed appropriate. Three observations
merit discussion.
First, the policy preferences of demographers for the
two fertility regimes are affected in an asymmetric
manner and this is to some extent affected by the
demographic context of the country in which the
respondent resides. The context matters quite a lot
for high-fertility regimes whereas it does not matter
for low-fertility regimes. To restrict our attention to
high-fertility regimes (Model 4): the higher the
NRR in the country of residence, the higher the
threshold level of fertility at which government inter-
vention is seen by demographers as necessary step.
This is an important finding, because it underscores
that judgements are influenced by the circumstances
in which people live. These judgements may be made
for a myriad of reasons. For demographers living in
high-fertility countries, one reason could be that
they believe their threshold to be feasible and that
striving for a lower threshold might be overambitious
in the short run. Furthermore, in a high-fertility
environment, government initiatives to lower fertility
could be viewed by respondents as restricting
freedom of choice. In contrast, in a low-fertility
environment, government intervention would mean
encouraging childbearing. To shift the level of inter-
vention upwards, governments would allow or facili-
tate more freedom of choice, which is generally
perceived as a positive move.
The second effect concerns the impact of the per-
ceived consequences of population growth or
decline and this effect also shows some differences
across the two regimes. Demographers with concerns
about overpopulation and the carrying capacity of
the earth choose a lower TFR at which governments
should intervene than those who are not concerned.
In other words, these concerned demographers may
see the upside of trends towards low fertility, as alle-
viating the pressure on issues of global overpopula-
tion. And clearly those who are concerned about
the issue of overpopulation when they cast their
eye on high-fertility regimes certainly prefer govern-
ment intervention at a lower TFR. What differen-
tiates the two fertility regimes is that the concerns
about overpopulation in a low-fertility regime are
more or less neutralized if the demographer is also
concerned about population decline harming econ-
omic growth. And, of course, concerns about the
adverse economic consequences of population
decline do not matter at all when the demographer
assesses the situation in a high-fertility regime.
To see the effects of concerns about global popu-
lation growth and the demographic context more
clearly, in Table 4 we offer a simulation of the pre-
dicted probabilities of each choice outcome for the
case of high-fertility regimes.
The concerns of demographers that global popu-
lation growth exceeds the carrying capacity of the
earth have a major impact on the threshold level
when it comes to high-fertility regimes. For instance,
if we compare demographers with low concern about
these issues with those who are very concerned, we
Table 4 Predicted probabilities of threshold fertility intervention levels for high-fertility regimes
Distribution of threshold levels TFR
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 or higher Total
Sample average1 0.32 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.03 0.08 1.00
Concerns about carrying capacity of the earth
Low 0.15 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.05 0.12 1.00
High 0.34 0.29 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.04 1.00
Net reproduction rate in country of residence
0.8 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.06 1.00
1.5 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.05 0.10 1.00
1These are the sample probabilities underlying the model in column (4) of Table 3.
Source: As for Table 1.
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can clearly see how this impacts their population
policy preferences: 63 per cent of the ‘concerned’
demographers give a threshold level of 3.0 children
per woman or lower, whereas this preference for
the threshold level of 3.0 children is only shared by
37 per cent of the ‘unconcerned’ demographers.
The distribution is less skewed but still pronounced
for the context of decision-making: the NRR level
where the demographer lives. For those living in a
below-replacement country (NRR = 0.8), 55 per
cent give a threshold level of 3.0 children or lower.
In an above-replacement country (NRR = 1.5) only
42 per cent support a threshold of 3.0 children or
lower.
A third observation to be made from Table 3 is that
political orientation does not matter significantly
when respondents are asked to focus on the
threshold level at which government intervention is
supported, either in a high- or a low-fertility
regime. Apparently, demographers see this as an
issue where scientific knowledge of the situation at
hand matters rather than political orientation. And
perhaps that is why demographers with a high level
of knowledge about family planning or reproductive
health also give slightly higher fertility thresholds for
government intervention in low-fertility regimes than
demographers who do not consider themselves ferti-
lity experts (Model 2). In other words, family plan-
ning experts are (slightly) more concerned about
the TFR dropping too much in low-fertility societies
(Lutz et al. 2006).
The institution at which a demographer works
does not seem to matter much: whether they work
in an academic surrounding or an applied environ-
ment, such as a government agency or NGO, is irre-
levant for high-fertility regimes. Only in the case of a
low-fertility regime (Model 2) can we see a weak sign
that demographers working in a policy setting are in
favour of lower thresholds than those in an academic
setting.
A final observation is that the French-speaking
respondents are more set on intervening at higher
TFR levels in the low-fertility regime than the
English-speaking respondents (Model 2). This differ-
ence should not be exclusively attributed to those
living in France, but also to French-speaking
demographers living in Africa, Canada, and other
parts of the world.
Conclusion and discussion
Government involvement in matters of fertility has
been, and still is in some countries, a controversial
issue, whether considering low-fertility regions, such
as Europe (cf. Teitelbaum and Winter (1998), or
high-fertility regions, as illustrated by Robinson
(2015) and May (2017) for the case of sub-Saharan
Africa. Nonetheless, given the importance of the
societal consequences of population decline or exces-
sive (global) population growth, population policy is
like the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’. Under-
standing how judgements and decisions at the
national or the supranational level are made is there-
fore important for understanding dilemmas in popu-
lation policy. And in this vein, the current paper
offers food for thought, as it draws on the inter-
national background of population experts who
ponder the dilemmas of population growth and
decline and who are asked to think about whether
governments should intervene in matters of fertility.
By showing their attitudes and population policy pre-
ferences, we can gain insights that are not so easily
obtained from other sources. Four important
elements stand out.
First of all, the demographers display in their
policy preferences a wide interval of non-interven-
tion by the government in matters of fertility. The
median demographer in the survey would consider
fertility levels between 1.4 and 3.0 as an interval in
which they would not support government interven-
tion. It suggests that professionals do not immedi-
ately ‘cry wolf’ when total fertility drops below the
bar of 2.1.
Second, an important driver for this policy stance
among demographers is their assessment of (or con-
cerns about) the pros and cons of population growth
or decline. In high-fertility regimes especially, the
concern about the carrying capacity of the earth
matters considerably in intervening in private
choices on fertility: concerned demographers
support action at lower thresholds than experts
without this sense of concern. In low-fertility
countries the situation is different: concerns about
global overpopulation are kept in check by concerns
over the economic consequences of population
decline. In other words, population decline is a
mixed blessing: it perhaps alleviates the concerns of
overpopulation, but it may hamper economic growth.
Third this paper provides evidence that demo-
graphic context matters considerably in deciding on
population policies, but only for high-fertility
regimes. However, we found both an expected and
an unexpected effect. The expected effect is that
demographers are more in favour of government
involvement in high-fertility countries, the higher
the NRR in their place of residence. However, a
notable finding is that demographers who reside in
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countries with a high NRR also have higher
threshold levels before they would suggest govern-
ments intervene compared with demographers
living in countries with a low NRR.
Fourth, this paper clearly shows that the political
orientation of demographers is important in deciding
on the principal issue of whether governments should
intervene in matters of fertility at all. Demographers
who place themselves on the right of the political
spectrum are more set on intervention in matters of
fertility than left-wing experts. And this applies to a
larger extent for low-fertility than high-fertility set-
tings. This finding contrasts with what we would
expect based on the fact that people on the political
right cherish freedom of choice, whereas we would
expect those at the other end of the spectrum to
have no qualms about supporting collective action.
This may be in large part because the political right
may cover different types of people, varying from
progressive right to conservative right. The latter
may be more inclined to support government inter-
vention in increasing fertility in low-fertility settings.
Of course, we can also see this divide between left
and right as reflecting a dichotomy in historical popu-
lation debates between optimists and pessimists
about ‘the force of reason’ (Sen 1997). Those belong-
ing to the political left and progressive right (the opti-
mists) would trust individuals and families to act
responsibly, whereas the conservative right would
be pessimistic about the force of reason and would
favour intervention by the state in matters of fertility.
Discussion
This paper brings to the fore dilemmas that are in
store for governments around the world, as in the
long run many countries will probably face popu-
lation decline (Reher 2007; Lutz et al. 2018) and, at
the same time, the issue of global climate change
will increasingly demand the attention of govern-
ments and citizens. Governments in low-fertility
countries will probably struggle with the dilemma
of national vs. global interests, and traces of this
struggle are reflected in the choices made by
demographers in the survey on the threshold levels
of intervention for low-fertility settings. Acting to
increase fertility may be perceived by governments
as furthering the national interest, whereas the
global interest would imply efforts to maintain the
status quo of low fertility and certainly not to
increase fertility. The global interest is, of course,
the most difficult to secure. Sandler (2004) has
shown that these types of dilemmas are extremely
difficult to solve in practice, as governments are
tempted to cater to the needs of their constituents
and hence prefer to put the interests of their nation
first.
This brings us to the second element that might
prove challenging. Citizens, also, will probably
display the stance that we earlier discovered among
the Dutch population (Van Dalen and Henkens
2011): the large majority of the population wants
the global population to decrease, but their own
group—the national population—to remain stable.
In other words, people’s population preferences will
probably display the ‘not-in-my-backyard’ attitude
that is common in quite a number of ‘public good’
issues. Furthermore, judgements made in demogra-
phy are not neutral, as is the case in other disciplines
(Van Dalen 2019). Demographers on the political
right are more persuaded than demographers on
the left to intervene in matters of fertility. A right-
wing orientation does not apparently signify, as
might be expected, a clear preference for freedom.
It is hard to determine what drives these results.
Being right-wing oriented could signify conservative
tendencies (perhaps also affected by prevailing reli-
gions in a country), but it could also mean that left-
oriented demographers have become more oriented
towards individual freedom of choice, as can be
seen in the Programme of Action adopted at the
ICPD in Cairo (UNFPA 1994), where sexual equality
and the reproductive rights of women and girls were
seen as being central to issues of population and
development. It should, however, be noted that the
impact of political orientation only applies when
asking the principal question, about government
intervention. Once demographers are asked to
reflect on the question of when government should
intervene, the political orientation effect is weak or
absent, and this suggests that demographers perceive
this decision as one outside the realms of politics.
This analysis is not without limitations. First of all,
we did not specify the nature of government inter-
vention in matters of fertility. The tacit assumption
is that governments would resort to voluntary
measures, as specified by the ICPD of 1994. Future
research might shed some light on the credibility of
specific government actions aimed at reducing or
increasing fertility levels. For instance, Engelman
(2011) has claimed that providing access to contra-
ceptives to address the unmet needs of women
around the world will be sufficient to end all unin-
tended pregnancies. But, as pointed out by Lutz
(2014), offering contraceptives can only work when
women become empowered through education to
influence their husbands or are educated to
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withstand fears that contraception has adverse
effects on health. Educating women is in his view
an essential part of population policies. And
authors who focus on reproductive justice may also
take issue with the idealized or textbook images
prevalent in family planning provision. The repro-
ductive movement emphasizes that there are ‘inter-
secting factors’ (Bose 2012; Sigle 2016), such as
race, sex, and class, that impact marginalized groups
of women. To take the policy example of Engelman,
not every woman has full access to the information
and facilities offered by family planning organiz-
ations, because of these intersecting factors.
A second limitation is that the data in this paper
were collected in 2009. The demographic reality has
changed since then, and this simple fact could poten-
tially affect the views of demographers on fertility.
For example, concerns about climate change may
have become more prominent since that time,
although we tend to forget that even at the time of
data collection, climate change was at the forefront
of public debate: former US vice president Al Gore
released An Inconvenient Truth (Gore 2006), the
Nobel Peace Prize 2007 was awarded jointly to
Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) for their efforts to generate aware-
ness about climate change, and the Stern Review
(Stern and Stern 2007) also made an impact in
policy circles.
This paper offers a view of how demographers
judge the demographic problems of societies—devel-
oped and less developed—and how these views could
translate into policy advice. So far, demographers
have made an effort to register the private fertility
preferences of citizens (Goldstein et al. 2003;
Hagewen and Morgan 2005; Lutz et al. 2006); the
current study tries to reveal what the public fertility
preferences of societies are, as perceived by
demographers. By analysing the policy preferences
of demographers as a group, we profit from the diver-
sity of nationalities and experiences. And this type of
research contributes to key questions in political
demography as perceived by Weiner (1971). He
stated back in the 1970s that ‘it is not enough to
know the facts and figures of population—that is fer-
tility, mortality and migration rates; it is also necess-
ary to consider the knowledge and attitudes that
people and their governments have toward popu-
lation issues’. Teitelbaum (2015) re-emphasized
recently that this field is seriously under-researched
by demographers. The current paper underscores
the importance of this strand of demography, as it
shows that population policy preferences are
informed by economic or social judgements on the
consequences of population growth and decline, as
well by as the national context.
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